How the Role of Family in the Facilitation of Play From the Cultural Lens? Scholarly Articles

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Research Article

When the Transmission of Culture Is Child's Play

• Jessica Cucchiaro,
• Jumana Mohamedally

When the Manual of Culture Is Kid's Play

• Marking Nielsen,
• Jessica Cucchiaro,
• Jumana Mohamedally

ten

• Published: March thirty, 2012
• https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0034066

Figures

Abstract

Background

Humans frequently engage in capricious, conventional behavior whose primary purpose is to identify with cultural in-groups. The propensity for doing so is established early on in homo ontogenesis as children become progressively enmeshed in their own cultural milieu. This is exemplified by their habitual replication of causally redundant actions shown to them past adults. Yet children seemingly ignore such actions shown to them by peers. How then does civilisation get transmitted intra-generationally? Here we suggest the answer might be 'in play'.

Primary Findings

Using a improvidence concatenation blueprint preschoolers starting time watched an adult remember a toy from a novel apparatus using a series of actions, some of which were patently redundant. These children could then bear witness another kid how to open the apparatus, who in turn could prove a third child. When the adult modeled the actions in a playful manner they were retained down to the third child at higher rates than when the adult seeded them in a functionally oriented way.

Conclusions

Our results draw attending to the possibility that play might serve a critical function in the manual of human culture by providing a mechanism for arbitrary ideas to spread between children.

Citation: Nielsen M, Cucchiaro J, Mohamedally J (2012) When the Transmission of Civilization Is Child's Play. PLoS ONE 7(3): e34066. https://doi.org/10.1371/periodical.pone.0034066

Editor: Alex Mesoudi, Queen Mary, University of London, United Kingdom

Received: November 21, 2011; Accepted: February 26, 2012; Published: March 30, 2012

Copyright: © 2012 Nielsen et al. This is an open-admission article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted employ, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

Funding: The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Australian Enquiry Council (Discovery Project DP110100602) whose funding supported this piece of work. The funders had no role in report design, data collection and assay, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.

Competing interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

Introduction

When learning novel skills from adults children will replicate all of the actions demonstrated to them, including those having no credible purpose or causal function [i]–[4]. An explanation for this behavior is that when adults deliberately testify them how to do something children assume the adult has previously determined the rationality and utility of the actions used and hence that the demonstration is an endeavor at teaching something relevant [5], [6]. Adopting this attitude towards being taught relies on a perception of cognition disparity between teacher and learner, something that is probable to exist reduced when skills are to be transferred from kid to child [7]. Information technology could therefore be reasonably expected that in dissimilarity to adult-kid manual the reproduction of redundant actions would diminish or disappear in child-kid transmission. This is precisely what happens.

McGuigan and Graham [8] had 3- and 5-year-olds lookout man an adult employ a stick to retrieve a advantage from a novel box subsequently first inserting the stick into the box at several different openings [9], [10]. The child shown these actions was then given opportunity to act on the apparatus in front some other child who had not seen the original demonstration. The second kid could then demonstrate to a third and and so on down chains 8 children long. For one group of children the box was opaque and hence the consequences of each insertion into the box could not be hands determined [4]. For a second group the box was transparent, making information technology obvious that when the stick was inserted into a pigsty at the tiptop it struck an internal barrier and made no contact with that part of the apparatus from which the sticker was taken. This action was conspicuously redundant. When the box was opaque all children in the chain maintained the redundant stick insertion. Whereas the 3-year-olds transmitted the irrelevant actions whether the box was opaque or transparent, past the second child the 5-yr-olds had omitted the redundant deportment when the box was transparent. This shift from incorporating to omitting redundant deportment with age is in stark contrast to adult-kid scenarios whereby a tendency to over-imitate increases with age [xi], [12].

The strong propensity for children to absorb and repeat the behaviors of adults is argued to be fundamental to the proliferation of cultural practices and traditions [xiii]–[15]. This is especially true of the arbitrary, conventional skills that individuals use to identify with and align themselves with their cultural in-group. However civilisation is not only transmitted vertically, from generation to generation, just also horizontally, within generations [xvi]. How can this happen if children do not readily take on irrelevant aspects of their peers' beliefs? The answer might be 'past playing'. When children play together they often make upward the content of what they are doing equally they go. The use of objects tin exist refined and re-described equally becomes necessary, with their functions assigned purely by virtue of collective understanding [17]. These objects thus attain what are called 'status functions' [xviii] and they are a pivotal component of any human civilisation (due east.g., a slice of paper with a number and a pretty moving picture is currency only considering the people who use it agree so). Moreover, from play pretending grows, and information technology is in this practice of the child's imagination that insight into the minds of others may be fostered [19]–[22]. Every bit play, and specially pretense, normally consists of rules that be purely because the players agree they "be" information technology provides a realm in which the intra-generational transfer of cultural ideas tin can take hold [23], [24].

To test this we adapted the improvidence chain technique employed by McGuigan and Graham [eight]. Preschoolers outset watched an adult demonstrate how to use an object to retrieve a toy from a novel box. She did this by slowly and deliberately performing a sequence of causally irrelevant disconnected actions (i.e., those that neither bear upon the box nor open it) and causally irrelevant connected actions (those which direct contact the box yet still practice not open up it). Both action forms were employed equally information technology has been shown that young children are less inclined to copy asunder actions than continued deportment [1]. Following demonstration of these redundant actions the developed placed the object to a switch located on the forepart of the box in a mode that resulted in it beingness opened. In ane condition children saw the deportment modeled in a functional manner typical of contemporary false inquiry; in another condition the deportment were demonstrated playfully. The children who saw these demonstrations were and so given opportunity to pass this data on to another child who in turn could laissez passer it on to a third child. If play enables the arbitrary behaviors that narrate human culture to be transferred between children the redundant deportment should exist maintained in the playful chains at a higher rate than the functional bondage. Nosotros too included a No Demonstration Control condition in which the first child in each chain was given a box to explore but was not given whatsoever data on how to open up it nor on how to use the object that came with information technology. This provided a betoken of comparison to check that the redundant actions are unlikely to be exhibited without being modeled beginning.

Further, psychology every bit a discipline has been criticized for focusing information collection on an overly express sample of the world's population [25], [26]. To this end we undertook testing in two distinct cultural communities: Brisbane, Australia and Colombo, Sri Lanka. As over-faux has been established in distinct cultural groups [11] and play is considered a human universal [27], [28] nosotros predicted that children would respond similarly, irrespective of their cultural heritage. Regardless, this approach enables data drove from a more heterogeneous sample than would arise if but one community were sampled.

Results

As predicted, preliminary analyses revealed that there were no pregnant differences in the responses of the Brisbane and Colombo children across whatsoever of the dependent variables. All subsequent analyses were thus conducted collapsed across communities. Further, regardless of chain position, for each condition there were no significant differences in children's production of the disconnected and connected deportment or in their success opening the boxes. Thus, in lodge to increase statistical power data was collapsed to form i overall mensurate where a score of vii indicates perfect replication of the adults initial sit-in (3 asunder actions+3 connected actions+successful box opening).

Showtime Child in Concatenation

The first stride in the primary analysis was to establish whether or not social learning of the actions from the modeling adult occurred. Demonstrating that it had, a i-way ANOVA with status (Playful, Functional, No Demonstration) as the between-groups gene and overall score as the dependent variable was meaning, F (2, 25) = 177.99, p<.001, partial η² = .93 (meet Effigy 1). Although 7 of the viii children in the No Demonstration Control condition were able to work out how to open the boxes without demonstration, none exhibited either the connected or asunder actions, resulting in a close to floor score (Thousand = .88, SD = .35). Conversely, children in the Functional and Playful conditions produced the actions with loftier levels of fidelity (M = 6.00, SD = 1.05 and Thou = vi.80, SD = .42 respectively). Reflecting these differences, Tukey HSD post-hoc tests indicated that children in the No Demonstration Command status replicated fewer actions than children in either the Functional or Playful weather (p<.001 for both), with children in the Playful status too producing significantly more deportment than those in the Functional condition (p = .046).

Retention Through Chains

Having established that children first in the Functional and Playful bondage had socially learned the actions the next step was to evaluate whether the actions were transmitted at different rates through the chains. In gild to do this, a repeated-measures ANOVA was run with Condition (Playful, Functional, No Demonstration) as a between-subjects gene and Concatenation Position (First, Second, Third) every bit a inside-subjects factor. The main effects for Status and Chain Position were significant, F (2, 25) = 35.22, p<.001, fractional η² = .74, and F (2, fifty) = 36.81, p<.001, partial η^two = .threescore respectively. Critically, indicating unlike rates of retention, the Condition 10 Concatenation Position interaction was also significant, F (4, 50) = x.64, p<.001, partial ηⁱⁱ = .46.

The Get-go Kid in Chain analysis reported higher up revealed condition-based differences in children's responses to the developed model. To farther clarify the Condition 10 Chain Position interaction a series of post-hoc independent-samples t-tests were conducted comparison the responses of children in each condition at the 2d and tertiary positions of each chain. At the second position in the concatenation children in the No Sit-in Control condition produced significantly fewer actions (M = .88, SD = .35) than children in the Functional condition [M = three.30, SD = 2.06, t(16) = three.28, p = .005], and children in the Playful status [K = 5.00, SD = 2.00), t(xvi) = 5.73, p<.001]. The difference betwixt children in the Functional and Playful weather approached significance, t(18) = 1.87, p = .077.

For children at the third position, those in the Playful condition produced significantly more actions (M = 4.xx, SD = 2.15) than children in either the Functional condition [One thousand = 1.fifty, SD = 1.43, t(18) = 3.30, p = .004], or children in the No Demonstration Command condition [1000 = .88, SD = .35, t(16) = 4.30, p = .001]. There was no difference between children in the Functional and No Sit-in Command conditions, t(16) = 1.20, p = .249. Thus, in contrast to those in the Playful condition, by the third generation, children in the Functional condition were no longer producing the target actions at rates distinct from those who were non exposed to them in the beginning.

Give-and-take

Children have been consistently shown to copy all of the actions used by an developed when solving a novel job, even when the acts clearly have no causal relevance to the demonstrated outcome and even when they may really compromise success. And they take been demonstrated to do so from early in ontogeny, in atypically developing populations and from wide-ranging cultural groups (notably, the current study extends over-imitation to another cultural group) [2], [xi], [29]. This over-faux behavior has been viewed as an expression of the man cultural heed; a mind that must be able to quickly larn the skills for engaging with a multitude of objects and tools while simultaneously assimilating the traditions of relevant social in-groups [24], [30], [31]. Nonetheless, as exemplified by their responses in diffusion chain studies, children do not readily over-imitate peer models [8]–[10], [12], [32]. Over-imitation might thus be considered a conduit for the vertical transmission of cultural information, but non for horizontal transmission.

Nosotros reasoned that the previously demonstrated lack of children's over-faux of other children might be attributable to the nature of the initial adult demonstration. That is, when an developed seeds the target action in the first kid it is typically done in a serious, pedagogical mode. This might facilitate adult-child manual [six], [33]–[35] but not subsequent child-child transmission; specially if children have little or no reason to view their peer model as an expert [seven], [36], [37]. In contrast, when playing children will unhesitatingly adopt the not-functional, arbitrary actions and behaviors of their playmates. We thus hypothesized that redundant deportment would be more likely to filter downward diffusion chains if originally modeled in a playful rather than a serious way. This hypothesis was supported.

Although in that location was some deterioration in the exhibition of the irrelevant target actions from the starting time to the 3rd child in both experimental conditions, the loss was greater for children in the Functional condition. Indeed, by the third kid in each Playful chain, 8 of 10 children nevertheless exhibited at least i of the disconnected actions and seven children exhibited at to the lowest degree one of the connected actions. In stark contrast only 2 children in the Functional status produced a disconnected activeness and just 2 produced a continued activity (1 kid did both – i.east., 7 of x children produced neither disconnected nor connected irrelevant actions). Framing the initial demonstration as 'playful' thus appears to facilitate the retention and transmission of redundant actions. A limitation of this work is that we did not directly code children'south behavior when interacting with each other, and hence nosotros cannot unequivocally claim that a playful attitude facilitated transmission of the irrelevant actions. Future research is thus needed to definitively plant what aspects of child-kid interaction lead to irrelevant actions being passed on and adopted.

According to the contact principle mechanical interactions cannot occur at a distance, something that even very young infants are sensitive to. Considering they are less probable to be misinterpreted as having a coincidental connection to the target upshot, Lyons et al. [1] predicted that rates of over-imitation would diminish for deportment violating this principle. In line with their prediction, 4-year-olds were institute to produce irrelevant actions on one one-half of a puzzle box at lower rates when information technology was physically separated from the second half of the box where a toy could be retrieved from, compared with when both halves were connected. We thus expected disconnected actions would more decumbent to extinction than connected deportment. This did not happen within each experimental status, where children at each point in the chains were no more than likely to produce the asunder than connected deportment. This contrast between the current study and Lyons et al. may be attributable to procedural differences. In Lyons et al. the disconnected actions were performed on an object separated from the apparatus that the target object could exist retrieved from. In the current study the disconnected actions were performed in the empty space surrounding the apparatus. Equally our written report was non explicitly designed to investigate the differential consequence of disconnected and connected actions, precisely why this procedural change had the upshot it did is unclear. Exploring this issue is a affair for future research.

Information technology is likewise notable that in order to emphasize their non-serious nature and to circumvent the demand for narrative to exist transmitted as well as actions, children in the Playful condition were given toy objects whereas those in the Functional condition were not. It is thus possible that the results we written report are attributable to the different objects used. All the same, this seems unlikely. Half of the children in the no sit-in command condition were given 1 of the playful objects to utilise; yet not one of these children spontaneously produced any of the irrelevant actions. Yet, by virtue of their very nature, the car and cow have pre-established affordances as play objects and this could have primed children'south reactions. Time to come research is thus needed to determine if children will reply in the same way every bit those in the current study if they are modeled playful actions on unfamiliar, cryptic objects.

It has been argued that children larn new skills and behaviors by copying adults and older peers who are perceived as beingness more knowledgeable [38]. Through what is known as a 'zone of proximal evolution' children's abilities are thus scaffolded to a new level. In this context information technology makes sense that children are more than inclined to adopt novel, ostensibly functional, actions from a 'more than competent' adult than a same-aged peer. In dissimilarity, children'due south play normally features the enthusiastic creation of arbitrary rules and rituals where the direct consequences of actions are markedly macerated or absent ('spilling' a pretend 'loving cup of tea' onto the carpeting is less likely to incur the rancor of i's parents than spilling bodily tea; missing a lion with an arrow is considerably less dangerous if the 'lion' is a tree). Inbound into playful games with peers is much more most engaging with others than it is virtually acquiring object-related skills. When confronted with a peer whose seemingly irrelevant actions are couched as play behavior, adopting the actions becomes more than near social interaction and less virtually skill acquisition. There is a greater adventure, then, that redundant actions will be passed on.

The notion that play serves to place irrelevant actions in a social frame has wider implications for existing views on over-imitation. It has been argued that this phenomenon stems from a motivation to be like and be liked by others [39], [40] and from the assumption that unnecessary actions ought to be performed every bit part of a learned behavioral norm [iii], [41]. Whereas these perspectives can business relationship for the manual of redundant actions in the playful condition introduced here, they fail to explain their lack of uptake in the functional condition. Others posit that over-simulated arises from defoliation about the causal relations between deportment and their outcomes [42] or that information technology is an evolved heuristic for learning nearly causally opaque cultural artifacts [30]. These less socially oriented interpretations can explain why children adopt redundant deportment modeled by an assumedly knowledgeable adult but ignore them when shown by an inexpert peer model. However, neither theory, without elaboration, provides a reason for the manual of irrelevant deportment in the playful condition. Though the phenomenon can be traced dorsum to earlier work [43], the term 'over-imitation' and research devoted to dissecting information technology are only one-half a decade old [1]. It is nonetheless a striking beliefs. Indeed the proclivity shown by both immature children and adults to adopt patently irrelevant components of a model's demonstration is seemingly incongruous with the early evolution of a capacity for selective imitation [39], [44]. Prolonged debate regarding the nature of this new social learning puzzle can thus exist expected. What the current information indicate is that finding a broad coverall explanation for the ways over-imitation gets expressed is likely to prove challenging.

Children oftentimes incorporate elements of the lives of the adults around them when they play: That is, they bring part of their civilization in [28]. Here we bear witness how play may not only practise this only that it tin also enable cultural ideas, in the form of arbitrary actions, to spread from kid to child. It remains to exist firmly established whether play does so because of the special nature of the social interactions that it consists of [17], [23], [24], considering it is in play exchanges that a theory of mind takes agree [19]–[22], or because of some other as yet unidentified reason. Regardless, in order for whatsoever beliefs to be considered 'cultural' it must propagate in a social group. Scholars of cultural development take thus emphasized the roles of fake and pedagogy in facilitating the emergence and spread of habits and traditions [six], [xiii], [14], [15]. The condition of play as a cultural transmission device has received far less attending [17], [24], [45]. Nevertheless unless show is mustered to suggest kid-child interaction has piffling to practise with the spread of cultural ideas, play may yet prove to be equally necessary and worthy of increasing research focus.

Materials and Methods

Ideals Statement

The participants' parents provided written informed consent and the Behavioural & Social Scientific discipline Ethical Review Commission of the University of Queensland specifically canonical this study (Application #2009001642).

Participants

Forty-two children (24 boys) aged between 4 and five years (Grand = 53.five months; SD = 3.4 months; Range = 48 months to 59 months) from Brisbane, Australia participated in this study. All children tested were White and lived in metropolitan suburbs surrounding a big university. An additional two children were tested but excluded from the data ready as a result of experimenter error. Both were first in No Sit-in control status bondage. Other children who subsequently served as the start child in the relevant bondage replaced these children. 40-two (21 boys) similarly aged children (G = 54.1 months; SD = five.8 months; Range = 41 months to 66 months) from Colombo, Sri Lanka as well participated. Almost all the Sri Lankan children were Sri Lankan, an isle that classifies every bit part of the South Asian subcontinent. Three children were of Indian origin, and one child was half White just had lived in Sri Lanka for most of her life.

Children were randomly allocated to one of 3 conditions: 15 from each cultural group to a Functional condition, fifteen to a Playful condition, and 12 to a No-model control status. This resulted in 10 chains of 3 children for each of the main experimental conditions and 8 chains of 3 children for the control condition. Residents native to each city conducted all testing.

Apparatus

Two similar opaque wooden boxes (19.5 cm×12.5 cm×6.5 cm) were used (run across Figure 2). Each independent a hidden toy that could exist obtained past releasing a switch machinery located on the front of the box. For one box the switch had to be pushed in, for the other box the switch had to be slid from right to left. The use of the boxes was counterbalanced beyond atmospheric condition. Four objects were also used (run across Figure two); two for the Functional condition – a blackness wooden stick and a big metal key (for reasons beyond our control this had to be replaced by a teaspoon for the Colombo testing), and two for the Playful condition – a toy cow and a toy car. It was necessary to utilise dissimilar objects across weather in club to emphasize the playful nature of the latter while avoiding the need for verbal descriptions to be passed from child to kid of what the objects were or how they were to exist employed. The objects were used evenly across children and boxes in their respective conditions.

Procedure

All children were tested in a quiet area of their childcare middle away from any activities or other children. Children were randomly allocated to one of three conditions. Across all conditions the developed acted in a warm and friendly way, engaging the children with advisable levels of eye contact.

Functional condition.

Kid A (the outset child in the improvidence chain) was asked to sit down to the side of the adult demonstrator so that both were facing one of the boxes. The demonstrator took the object associated with the box and said 'watch me and and so y'all tin have a get'. She then slowly and deliberately performed 1 of two distinct sequences (balanced beyond boxes and conditions) of irrelevant disconnected actions and irrelevant connected actions (Sequence 1: slide the object on the ground surrounding the box, iii times, in a semi-round pattern and then slide the object across the lid of the box, from left to right, three times; Sequence ii: slide the object across the ground behind the box, moving from left to right 3 times then tap the object iii times across the tiptop of the box, moving from left to right). This was followed by the activity that disengaged the hidden machinery and opened the box. When the adult performed the actions she included verbalizations that were either descriptive or were intended to echo the sounds being made past the object (e.g., for the stick maxim "slide, slide, slide" when it was beingness wiped on the footing surrounding the box and "swoop, swoop, swoop" when being slid across the box's chapeau; for the key saying "skoot, skoot, skoot" when sliding it across the ground backside the box and 'tap, tap, tap' when hit it on the box's hat). Her actions were modeled in a manner that was intended to engage the child via ostensive chatty cues [33] involving directly eye contact and performance of the target actions in a deliberate, structured manner. In one case the box was opened, the toy was removed and shown to the child. Afterwards this sequence was repeated the object was placed abreast the airtight box and the child was told 'at present it's your turn'. If necessary the kid was given generic prompts (e.g. "keep, you tin exercise it" and "you can do what ever y'all desire"). This phase was terminated when the kid either opened the box or later 10 minutes had expired.

Afterward Kid A had opened the box, regardless of the means used, Kid B was brought into the test area and told to wait while the start kid had a second endeavour at opening the box. No explicit instructions were given to either kid about teaching or imitating, and the experimenter ensured that each child had a clear view of the box, the object, and the deportment being performed. Later on Child A had finished demonstrating, he/she left the test surface area and Child B was given the box and object and told 'at present it's your plough' equally per Child A. This procedure continued through to the third and terminal child.

Playful condition.

This general process for this condition was identical to the Functional Condition. However, the action sequences shown to Child A were performed by the developed using one of the ii play objects. The actions themselves were also modeled emphasizing their playful manner, incorporating knowing looks and smiles [46], [47] and including verbalizations typically fabricated with such objects (for the car maxim 'whoosh, whoosh, whoosh' for one sequence of actions and 'vroom, vroom, vroom' for the other sequence; for the moo-cow saying 'moo, moo, 'moo' for 1 sequence of actions and 'gobble (equally if eating), gobble, gobble' for the other).

No demonstration command condition.

Kid A was shown the box and associated object, and was told, 'lots of boys and girls have had a go, and now it'due south your turn'. Children were so allowed to manipulate the box as they wished until they either opened the box or afterward 10 minutes expired. When Child B was brought in Child A was asked to demonstrate 'what y'all can practise with it'.

Coding and Reliability

There were three dependent variables for each box: (1) the frequency with which each child produced the asunder irrelevant actions; (2) the frequency with which each child produced the connected irrelevant actions; and (3) whether or not the box was opened. For the Brisbane children, responses were coded from video recorded during each session. A second observer, blind to the aims and hypotheses of the study and to the kid's condition, independently coded a chain from each condition (i.east., 9 children). There was 100% agreement beyond raters for all dependent measures. Nosotros were unable to obtain ethical approval to video the children in Colombo. Coding was therefore conducted in real time past two observers (the third writer and a volunteer research assistant). Inter-observer agreement was high for each dependent measure out: for disconnected irrelevant actions Cohen's κ = .81; for connected irrelevant deportment κ = .80; and for box opening Cohen'southward κ = .95. As the more experienced of the two coders, information was subsequently based on that taken past the third author.

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to the children who participated and the managers of the childcare centers who helped facilitate data collection.

Author Contributions

Conceived and designed the experiments: MN JC. Performed the experiments: JC JM. Analyzed the data: MN. Contributed reagents/materials/analysis tools: MN. Wrote the paper: MN.

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Source: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0034066

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